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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
~T.A.TE OF l~'TAH by and through 
its ROAD COM~IISSION, D. H. 
\V"HITTENBURG, Chairman, H. J. 
CORLEISSEN and LAYTON 
MAXFIELD, Me1nbers of the State 
Road Co1mnission, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
COOPERATIVE SECURITY COR-
POR ... c\_TION OF CHURCH OF 
JESl~S CHRIST OF L.D.S., a non-
profit corporation of the State of 
Utah, and WASATCH STAKE OF 
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
L.D.S., H. CLAY CUMMINGS, 
Trustee, and President of Wasatch 
Stake, a corporation sole of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. · 7797 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENTS OF FACTS 
This action was commenced in Wasatch County to 
condemn for a state highway over lands o'\\rned by the 
defendants in that county. On motion of the plaintiff, 
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the cause was transferred to Utah County for trial. De-
fendants waived a jury, and the cause was tried without 
a jury before the Honorable Joseph I£. Nelson, one of the 
judges of the Fourth Judicial District. 
The Statement of Facts, so called 1n the Brief of 
Appellant, is so utterly 1nisleading, inaccurate, and un-
fair, that we deen1 it necessary to state the record and 
the cause at length. 
The premise of Appellant's ground for appeal, is the 
staternent made in the brief that: 
"The 7.89 acres taken by plaintiff was a portion of 
a larger tract of pasturage, containing, before the 
taking, 131.79 acres (Tr. 4). * * * All the improve-
ments constructed by defendants in connection with 
the creation and operation of the dairy farm are 
placed upon the tract lying to the north and west 
of U. S. Highway 40, no improvements were con-
structed on the tract, a part of which plaintiff took 
by this action.'' 
"Defendants over plaintiff's objection, presented 
their case on the theory that the plaintiffs, by the 
taking of 7.89 acres pasture land from the tract of 
131.79 acres, damaged the entire dairy farm as a 
going business; that the entire farm, as an operating 
unit, had been severely damaged by the taking of 
less than eight acres pasture land (Tr. 20ff)." 
The complaint of the plaintiff alleged: 
"6. That each of the parcels sought to be con-
demned as hereinabove referred to and set forth, 
is only a part of an entire parcel or tract or piece 
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of property, or intere~t in or to property, owned by 
the aforesaid defendants.'' 
There \Yere attached to the con1plaint as Exhibits 
~ ~ ~\' ', · · .... -\-1'' and ~ ~ .... -\-2' ', uiaps showing the location, 
general route, and tern1ini of the highway project, and 
sho\Ying the property \vhich the plaintiff seeks. 
~ · ... -\nd sho,ving the property of the defendants herein 
as affected by these condemnation proceedings.'' 
The 1naps attached as Exhibits to the complaint, do 
not describe the outside or any boundary lines of the 
property of the defendants, and do not specify the acre-
age of the property of the defendants. 
The ans\\~er of defendants ad1nits that part of para-
graph 6, alleging that the parcels of land sought to be 
conde1nned are a part of a larger tract of land owned 
by the defendants, and that the taking of the said parcels 
of property described in the complaint 
"Will destroy and greatly injure and da1nage the 
remaining property of said ranch owned by said 
defendants.'' 
It is further affirmatively alleged in the answer of 
defendants, that the lands through which the road is pro-
posed to be constructed, were purchased and improved 
by modernizing and reconditioning the dwelling house 
located thereon, and by the construction of modern dairy 
barns and sheds and a grade A sanitary milking parlor, 
and other improven1ents thereon; new fences, cross 
fences, a deep well, etc., and that the property was im-
proved and developed into a modern dairy ranch, suitable 
for the operation thereon of one hundred head of dairy 
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cows. 
It is further set out in the answer, that the plan of 
operation of the dairy ranch is a part of a general L.D.S. 
Church Welfare project of Wasatch County, and vicinity. 
That the plan of operation includes the furnishing of 
hay and grain from sinaller farrns in the Heber \Talley, 
one by each Ward in the Stake, so that the 1nilking barns 
and facilities would be used to the utmost capacity and 
the lands would be devoted to pasturage, and that the 
taking of the pasture land sought to be conde1nned 'vould 
da1nage the whole set up and project substantially, and 
reduce the carrying capacity of the ranch in pasturage 
and that the value of the remainder would be lessened 
and the defendants greatly da1naged by the severance. 
It is further alleged in the answer, that there are no 
available lands adjacent to said ranch or in the vicinity 
thereof, that can be purchased to replace the lands sought 
to be condemned. 
The case proceeded to trial, the plaintiffs lead off 
with a witness, Vernon Bridge (Tr. 3), who was the chief 
right of way design engineer of the State Road Commis-
sion, and he produced a 1nap which was marked plain-
tiff's Exhibit "A" and placed upon the board (Tr. 4). 
THIS MAP IS NOT THE SAME AS EXHIBIT "A" 
ATTACHED TO THE COMPLAINT. 
The Exhibit "A" offered and received in evidence, 
is a large map which has printed upon it in large letters: 
''Map Showing the Property of Cooperative Securi-
ty Corp. in the NWl)t and SW14 NEJ/t_ of Section 
32, T. 28 R.5E, SLM, and the portion i'equired for 
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higlnvay purposes. Wasatch County, Septe1nber 
1950. l>roj. No. S240 (1). Scale: 1" = 100'." 
era yon, put on by the engineer: 
'· CooperatiYe 8eenrity Corporation. Total acreage 
- 131.79 _._\C re1naining = 123.90 AC." 
The "·itness, Bridge, upon request, stepped down and 
explained the Exhibit and the various markings and 
colors thereof, and gave this answer ( Tr. 4) : 
'~The portion of the map sho"\vn outlined in red ink 
lines represents the property owned by the Coopera-
tiYe Seeurity Corporation before the taking by this 
conden1nation, consisting of a total acreage of 131.79 
acres." 
This red line runs around the entire property, an 
unbroken line, and around the portion of the property 
of defendants lying on the North side of U.S. Highway 
40, and it is upon this portion of the property that the 
Inap shows the frame house, pump, cinder block milk 
barn, frame barn, chicken coop and grainery as improve-
Inents, and the witness then also pointed out the portions 
and the colors of the part sought to be condemned. 
This map and this tract, the whole area contained 
within the outside red lines and shown on the map, 
Exhibit "A", was referred to constantly and was before 
the eyes of the Court and witnesses and counsel at all 
ti1nes during the trial, was treated and considered as 
the map, layout, description, boundary and fact of the 
tract, parcel, piece, unit, ranch and property of the de-
fendants affected by the condemnation. 
We were surprised and astonished, therefore, to find 
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in the State1nent of Facts in Appellant's Brief, as the 
very basis of this appeal and running throughout the 
Brief, both in the State1nent of Facts, and in the Argu-
lnent of Points, that 7.89 acres taken by plaintiff "\vas a 
portion of a larger tract of pasturage, containing, before 
the taking, 131.79 acres, and that this 131.79 acres did 
not include the land North and West of Highway 40. 
Throughout the trial and in all of the testimony 
and in the examination of witnesses, both by the defend-
ants and the plaintiff, the piece, parcel or tract fro1n 
which the portion conde1nned was taken, was treated and 
considered as the property of the defendants affected by 
the condemnation, that North and West of Highway 40, as 
well as that South and East of Highway 40. Highway 
40 was described as an easement right of way. It was 
detailed how the cows after milking, were driven across 
Highway 40 and turned into the pasture on the South 
and East side; how they were brought home in the eve-
ning for milking across Highway 40, and to the n1ilking 
barns. The matter of the new highway and its joining 
into Highway 40, and the effect upon the driving of the 
cows to and from the barns, was detailed by the witnesses 
and throughout, with every witness, it was assumed and 
taken for granted and not questioned but that this was 
a unified farm and farm operation and that the parcel 
which was damaged by the severance was all that re-
mained and not just the meadows. 
There was in the trial, the usual difficulty, in the 
examination of witnesses, to keep then1 from considering 
damage to the business carried on, as distinguished fron1 
damage to the market value of the remainder, but the 
evidence and testimony of the witnesses, lay and expert, 
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all \\~ent to the theory that the farn1 \Va~ a unit and 
one parcel or tract. 
Perhaps the \vitnes8 1nost experienced as an expert 
"ri tne~8 in conde1nna tions, a1uong all those who were 
called by both parties, \vas Tho1nas E. Gaddis, of Salt 
Lake City~ "Tho "~as called by the plaintiff on values 
(Tr. 404). On cro~s exa1nination he gave the following 
testin1ony (Tr. -l-25) : 
· · Q. So if you had a ranch that had a capacity of 
pasture precisely for the herd he ran, and he 
took a slice of that away from that use, 
'vouldn't you figure that a buyer that wanted 
to use it for the same purpose would feel that 
he didn't have enough, and so he couldn't pay 
the full value for this plant that's there? 
.r\.. Well, -
Q. Do you think even a willing buyer would hesi-
tate on that score1 
.. A_. Not for just three acres, I don't think. 
Q. Well, cut off 10 acres out of 60. Wouldn't that 
hit him~ 
A. A little bit, yes. 
Q. A little bit. How much, in your opinion, would 
it reduce in percentage of over-all value, that 
little bit, taking ten percent of his pasture away 
from a many (n1an) having a unit of that sort, 
sir? 
A. What do you mean by over-all value1 
Q. Just what I said. 
7 
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A. I didn't assess that. 
Q. I didn't ask you to, but I'll let you assu1ne any 
over-all value you want to, sir, and ans,ver 1ny 
question. Don't spar with 1ne. 
A. The three acres. 
Q. l~ercentage I said, sir, of alllO acres off fro1u GO. 
A. The percentage of what now~ 
:)(: :)(: * 
Q. J>ercentage of difference in what a willing buyer 
would pay for a setup based upon 60 acres of 
pasture for a herd of dairy cows that equals 
the capacity of his dairy i1nprovement unit, and 
you took off 10 acres of his pasture. 
:)(: * * 
A. You waiting for my answer~ 
Q. Yes, Percentage. 
A. Six percent. 
Q.· Six percent~ 
A. Yes." 
H. Clay Cummings, called as a witness for defend-
ants (Tr. 20), resides at Heber, and is engaged in live-
stock and ranching, and is President of the Wasatch 
Stake, and has the total responsibility for the project 
of providing milk for the Church Welfare Progran1. The 
nature of the business on this property is the production 
of milk, dairying, and so1ne beef production. It has been 
in ownership of defendants about six years. He described 
the structure and in1prove1nents upon the premises; there 
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\ra~ a 1nodern ~ix roo1n ho1ne, culinary \Vater piped fron1 
the spring about 1700 feet away, and a concrete head-
hon:5e built oYer the :5pring; there was a mode~n 1nilking 
parlor constructed and planned for the milking of 75 
head of CO\YS~ \Yi th holding rooms and all the necessary 
equip1nent for n1ilking of the cows; there was a hay barn, 
eonstrncted for the containing of about 150 tons of hay; 
bull pens, calf sheds, feed racks, corral fences, concrete 
corral coverings~ bridges and extensive fencing, ditch-
ing, headgates, leveling, re1noving of trees and- brush, 
reseeding, fertilizing, a well, a deep well for house water 
supply~ heating plant in the milk house, milking parlor. 
These in1provements were all constructed after the year 
19-+5~ excepting the hon1e, 'vhich was remodeled. There 
'vas about $50,000.00 of cash put into these structures 
and this an1ount 'vas about matched with labor (Tr. 26). 
_.._\sked to describe the operation and use of these 
structures on this property in relation to the land, and 
particularly the land that is sought to be condemned, he 
ans,vered: The home is used for the caretaker, the milk 
parlor for milking 55 head of cows, at the date of taking, 
February 17, 1950, the sheds for their convenience, 
weather protection, feed racks for feeding them; water 
supplies for washing the barn and equipment and pro-
viding the livestock with drinking water; fences were for 
containing them within pasture boundaries; calf sheds 
were used for caring for young calves; improvements 
are very convenientaly located; there is a calf pasture of 
3 acres up a little valley, or swale. The improvements are 
built on a slope which provides perfect feed ground in 
Winter, Spring and Fall, the corrals are located on a 
general slope which provides for a perfect location for 
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thein, and inunediately across Ii ighway 40 is a pasture 
land which is used for grazing livestock. The crossing to 
the pasture was indicated as a point just South of the 
improvements and there was no obstruction or structures 
of any kind to prevent passing back and forth and tttsing 
the two sides of it as a unit (Tr. 28 ). And he described 
the meadow and pasture land in detail. He valued the 
property with the improvements as well worth $100,-
000.00 (Tr. 32), and testified that the losing of the ground 
being taken and the inconvenience being created by the 
construction of the road reduced the operations material-
ly, without reducing the costs of operating. 
Mr. Cummings was exa1nined at great length con-
cerning the various improvements and facilities and the 
uses to which the various portions of the farm were put, 
and as to the effect of the relation of the use of the milk-
ing establishment and the improven1ents and facilities 
thereof, to the pasture land in particular, and testified 
as to ho'Y the taking of the new right of way through the 
meadow land would affect the operation of the farm and 
plant as an operating unit. He testified in substance 
that the whole property, before the taking, was worth 
$100,000.00, and that after the taking, the remainder of 
the property was worth $80,000.00 in the market. 
Lyman Holmes Rich was called as a witness by de-
fendants. He is Extension Dairyman for the Utah State 
Agricultural College, with degrees of B.S. at U.S.A.C., 
and M.S. at University of Minnesota. From 1925 to 1929 
he was employed by the Utah State Agricultural College 
as County Agent of Wasatch County, and has since be-
come well acquainted with, and knows the dairy opera-
10 
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tion~ in that ('1onnty. lit> hn8 (•ha rge of the Dairy II erd 
In1prove1nent Progra1n, an at~sociation throughout the 
State of l 1 tnh, and hat~ n1ade regular visits to Wasatch 
County, so1netin1es t\YO to six trips a year, and is well 
acquainted \Yith the property involved in this case. When 
the land \Yas first purchased by the Church, he advised 
concerning its 1nanage1nent and assisted in purchasing 
liYestock and 1neeting "Ti th groups in organizing the 
project. He gaye testin1ony concerning the productivity 
of the land and particularly the meadows, and of the 
effect of the taking of the strip sought in condemnation 
upon the \vhole. He testified (Tr. 86) concerning the 
effect of driving heavy producing cows long distances, 
and particularly the effect it would have upon this herd 
if they \Vere driven to the Berg property, and returned 
to the n1ilking plant, and that this distance is too far 
to drive the cows. 
Dee ..._4_. Broadbent, (Tr. 97), was a witness for de-
fendants. He is a Professor of Agriculture and of Agri-
cultural Economics and acts as Director of the Agricul-
tural Experiment Station of the Utah State Agricultural 
College, has a B.S. degree from that institution, and a 
Master's degree from the University of Illinois, and ad-
ditional scholastic training there. He has made a special 
study of the operation of dairy farms and knows the 
property in question. He came down with Mr. Rich and 
another, and advised the committee upon the establish-
nlent of this project as an operating unit, the size and 
the use of the land, and the practices that should be 
adopted for the more efficient operation of the farm; 
and, since, he has met with the committees and advised 
them upon the layout and operational problems. 
11 
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I1e recognized that the liiniting factor in that dairy 
unit was the proportion of summer pasture to the whole, 
to Inaintain a dairy herd. The type of buildings con-
structed were set up to handle towards 100 cows, to 
u1ake the Inost efficient use of the capital resources, the 
buildings, ilnprovements and at least as a minimum for 
economical operation, ( Tr. 101). 
lie testified that about 60 acres of the land is fairly 
productive land, and a limiting factor in the efficient and 
economical operation of the farm. It was suggested that 
the productivity of the land be increased to where it 
would take care of a milking herd of exceeding 60 cows, 
and improvements by way of leveling and rotation of 
pasture were outlined, and he testified that the taking of 
the land in condemnation would reduce the herd below 
50 milking cows, without permitting any reduction in 
the operating cost (Tr. 102), and so damage and depre-
ciate the value of the entire set up and unit. 
L. J. Lowe, a licensed real estate broker, gave testi-
mony of values of the tract taken and the damage due 
to the severance (Tr. 111) (Tr. 237). 
Lowell Woodward, (Tr. 119), a soil scientist with 
the Soil Conservation Service of the Federal Govern-
ment, with a B.S. degree from U.S.A.C., with a major 
in Agronomy, testified concerning the depths of the soil 
in the various parts of the Church property and on the 
Berg property. 
Keith Holbrook, (Tr. 128), who operates a 437 acre 
farm and is a real estate agent as well, and engaged 
mainly in the dairy business, who resides at Salt Lake 
City, qualified as an expert and gave opinion upon the 
12 
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Yalue of the land taken and the :sl~Yerance da1nage. 1Iis 
tt·~ tin1ony \Vould haYe justified a judgment of $21,7 40.00 
( Tr. 134). 
1'. H. Heal, (Tr. 162), live~ at Provo and has owned 
ranehe:s and sold 1nany dairy ranches, engaged in the real 
e~tate busines8. qllalified as an expert, gave his opinion 
a8 to value. His testin1ony \vould have justified a judg-
Inent of $:2~.97 3.00, of \vhich $4,250.00 was for the land 
taken and the balance for severance damage (Tr. 171). 
TVelby Tr·. Young, (Tr. 186), of Heber City, is a 
far1uer in the dairy business. He was Advisor of the 
Farn1 Security Adnrinistration. in Wasatch County, a 
g·oyerninent lending agency, a Director of the Heber Val-
ley Dairymen's ..._:\._ssociation, Salt Lake Federated Milk 
Producers, Officer of the A1nerican Dairy Association 
of lTtah, and of the National Association, and gave de-
tailed testimony concerning this property from long 
acquaintaitce, and particular study and inforrnation. He 
testified that in his opinion, the severance of the pr9perty 
taken \Vould decrease the value of the remainder, in-
cluding the buildings, and without reference to the per-
sonal property, and that the whole amount of the depre-
ciation would be twenty percent of the over-all value, 
prior to the taking, which he fixed at $98,000.00 (Tr. 201). 
Jay Swain, (Tr. 246), iR the operator of the property 
and detailed its use since November of 1949. The use 
of Highway 40 and the changes in arrangement of 
bridges, etc., \Vere detailed by him. 
Nephi Probst, (Tr. 261), is a dairyman from 
\\Tasatch County. He was County Ward Supervisor, 
Chair1nan of the Agricultural Adjustment Agency of the 
13 
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U.S. Govern1nent, \Vater Master, Director of Irrigation 
co1npanies, operates a farm at Midway, where he Inilks 
fro1n 20 to 25 cows, and has some ranch cattle. He was 
especially familiar with the property in question~ and is 
in the Stake Presidency. J:Ie was particularly interested 
in the noxious weed matter, having had much to do with 
such troubles, and gave his opinion upon values. 
Every witness who gave an opinion on the 1natter, 
treated the farm as a unit and clearly pointed up the fact 
that these new and costly improvements that were placed 
upon the hillside North of Highway 40, were put there 
and maintained and constructed to be used and used in 
relation to all of the land belonging to the defendants 
on the other side of Highway 40. 
They pointed out, and took into consideration the 
fact that the new highway joined into Highway 40 in 
the front yard of the defendants. That the new highway 
created a junction and greater use of the high,vay and 
put a greater burden and danger and rendered less safe 
and efficient the use of the property North of High"ray 
40, in connection with the use of the remaining property 
South of Highway 40. 
It was not specificaJly proved where the fee of the 
strip occupied by Highway 40 rests. It is assumed and 
'vas assumed that the State has an easement under this 
ground and that the right of ·way easement is upon and 
across ground, the fee of which is vested in the defend-
ants, the owners of the property on both sides of the 
right of way, just as they are still the owners of the fee 
of the land traversed by the new highway. The map, 
Exhibit "A", shows this to be the fact by the surveys 
14 
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of the State. 
There "~a8 te8ti1nony eoncerning the availability of 
land8 to replace the land taken. This testin1ony 'vent to 
t\YO different situations. 
The ne\Y high,vay runB through the botton1 1neadow 
land of the Provo Ri Ye r \~·alley and East,vard fro In the 
JUnction \Yith High,vay 40, and the 1nilking barns, ete . 
.. ..-\. :Jir. Berg O\Yned the property up the canyon frm11 
the Church property, and adjoining it. The ne\v high-
"~ay cut through his land also. (Tr. 323). He was 
1)ern1itted to testify that jn the n1onth of April 1950, he 
had a conyersation with :\f r. Cun11nings and ''offered'.' 
to sell to the defendants pc:trt of his ground East of them 
and South of the new highway on over to the river 
(Tr. 324); but did not state at what price or upon what 
c~onditions; but on cross-e~a.mination (Tr. 335), this wit-
ness testified persistently that he would not sell his land, 
and he said under oath (Tr. 336) : 
"It is not for sale." 
The testimony is, also, to the effect that the piece 
rnentioned by him is not as good land as that taken fro1n 
the defendants. 
The other item of '~replacement property" \Vas 
developed from the cross -examination of Mr. Cu11nnings. 
He testified (Tr. 52), that since the property in con-
demnation 'vas taken, the defendants have leasPd fro1n 
the New Park Mining (jolnpany, so1ne territory V\Test 
and North of the barns, on an annual or yearly basis, 
and that the lease is subject to cancellation at any tiine 
i-he O\vner 1night desire t') cancel it, and he further tes-
15 
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~ified that this property v1as not for sale and that the 
1nining company would not sell it. 
As indicated, this case was tried to the Court \vithout 
a jury. The fact of the tract was specifically !uund by 
the Court as a trier of facts as follows : 
t, 
"6. That each of the parcels sought to he con-
deinned as hereinabove referred to and set forth i8 
only a part of an entire parcel or tract or piece of 
property, or intere8~ in or to property, OYvned by 
the aforesaid defendants. The said map introduced 
by plaintiff, and received in evidence marh:ed Ex-
hibit "A" shows the description and locatio11 of the 
aaid entire parcel or 1 ract of land owned by defend-
ants and affected by these proceedings. 
''Said property consisted of approximately 131.79 
acres of land, all o£ Vtrhich was used as a unit by 
defendants in the operation of a farm and as a dairy 
:farm. Situate upon the lands are a dwellin~ house, 
modern dairy, barns, f;heds, a grade A sanitary milk-
ing parlor, carrols, cement feeding platfo:rms and 
mangers, and a deep 'Vell flowing pure water used 
in the home and in the dairy barn, with pipes and 
troughs for its control, as well as fences and canals 
and ditches for the Pse and control of the irrigaticn 
and cultivation of said lands. Said farm as so laid 
out and equipped "',1.Tas suitable for the operation 
thereon of a modern 0airy and for the acommodation 
of one hunred head of dairy cows. Said dairv raneh 
._ ' 
and farm was so us~d by defendants as part of a 
general L.D.S. Church Welfare project of Wasatch 
County and vicinity and in cooperation with the ten 
16 
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'r ard~ of the \ Y as a teh Stake of said Church.'' 
"·The seYl~rauee of the portion sought to be taken 
and \!onden1ned by p1 aintiff in these proceedings, 
and the con~truction of the iu1proven1ent in the Inan-
ner proposed by the 11laintiff will greatly da1nage 
the re1nainder of s3.id parcel and pre1nises of the 
plaintiff and greatly t3epreciate the Inarket value of 
the ~aid re1nainder. '' 
By these Findings, thQ Court also found the fact to 
be that the property re1nainding to the defendants after 
the conden1nation 'vas greatly damaged, and the Inarket 
value of the ren1ainder r.reatly depreciated. 
The Cottrt, as trier of the facts, and in the formula 
of our statute, found thP fair n1arket value of the lands 
and improven1ents sought to be condemned to be the sum 
of $2,564.25, and the damages that accrued to the parcel 
and pre1nises of the defendants not sought to be con-
demned by reason of i~s severance from the portion 
sought to be condemned, and the construction of the 
improvements in the manner proposed by the plaintiff 
to be $10,919.57. 
There were no benef~ts pleaded, proved or claimed 
to the defendants from the taking. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POTNT I 
THE DAIRY FARM IS A UNIT OPERATION AND 
ONE "PARCEL" IN ONE OWNERSHIP. 
CONTIGUITY IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE. 
17 
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PO~NT II 
NO ADDITIONAL PASTURE LAND WAS AVAIL-
ABLE TO DEFENDANTS. 
POINT III 
THE CONDEMNEE HAS THE RIGHT TO INSIST 
UPON BEING PAID IN CASH, BOTH FOR THE LAND 
TAKEN AND FOR HIS DAMAGES TO THE REMAIN-
DER. 
POINT IV 
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL 
COURT ART CONCLUSIVE UPON THE FACTS OF VAL-
UE OF THE PROPERTY TAKEN, UNITY OF THE PAR-
CEL AND OF DAMAGE THERETO AND THE AMOUNT 
THEREOF RESULTING FROM THE SEVERENCE. 
POINT V 
THERE ARE NO ERRORS OF LAW REVIEWABLE 
BY THE SUPREME COURT CITED AS GROUNDS FOR 
REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT OR NEW TRIAL. 
POINT VI 
CONCLUSION: THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED. 
ARijUMENT 
POTNT I 
THE DAIRY FARM IS A UNIT OPERATION AND 
ONE "PARCEL" IN ONE OWNERSIDP. 
CONTIGUITY IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE. 
Upon the facts pertaining to the use of the farn1 
jmprovements in relation to the pasture land, there is 
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no di~pute. The Inilking barn~, sheds and other facilities 
\vere placed upon the south slope north of Highway 40 
becan~e, despite the haz,!lrds of High,vay 40, it was the 
be~t plaee and ~ituation, <~nd they 'vere built to a capacity 
to 1uate.h the excellent pasture o'vned by the saine entity. 
The inconvenience of eros~ing -±0 \vas not a sufficient 
objection~ in the eye~ of the experts from the College 
and the practical dairy 1uen, to deter the layout as the 
conden1nor found it. 
The easernent for th~ right of way over the fee under 
Highway -±0 \vas shown upon the map (Exhibit A) of 
the condemnor, but did not break the red line outlining 
the parcel fron1 which the part sought was carved. 
The existence of the highway does not divide the 
farn1 into separate parcels. 
That contiquity is n0t an absolute, IS abundantly 
established by the decisions. 
There is an annotation on the question of the rela-
tion of unity of use and contiquity of pro-perties essential 
to the allowance of damage~ in Eminent Domain proceed-
ings found in 6 ALR ('2d), commencing at page 1197. 
The general rules on the question are summarized In 
the following paragraphs, on page 1200: 
"Whatever the theory of compensation for injury 
to the remaining land, it conternplates prin1arily a 
single piece or tract of land of which part is taken. 
The courts have extended the rule, howeveri to em-
brace situations in whjch a tract is crossed by some-
thing lineally ilnposecl upon it-whether by nature, 
by 1nan, or by legal description-which viewed ob-
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
jectively divides it into sections, but which. \vithin 
the intent of the rule, does not d~stroy its unity as 
a single property. In certain unusual cases, they 
have even departed (;ntirely frorn the basis of the 
rule, namely, the virtual contiguity of the holdings, 
and applied the concept of unity to properties sep-
arated from one another by the lands of other own-
ers or by navigable \Vaters.'' 
The principle applied to lands used for farrning and 
sirnilar enterprises which are separated by a high,vay 
are treated at page 1220 : 
"12~ TRACTS SEPARATED BY HIGH.\VAY. 
"The same general principle applies in the case 
of rural tracts separated by a highway. The effect 
of the highway in separating them may be countered 
by proof that they are being held or employed to-
gether for the general purposes of the property, 
whether farming, stock-raising, logging, or other 
productive entertprise. It is not always that this 
proof is necessary, for occasionally a court will rec-
ognize an actual contiguity in the tracts if the fee is 
in the owner. A resort to this alternative rnay sup-
port the owner's claim where no present use of the 
land is shown. See Par. 2, supra. Between the two 
principles it is seldo1n that the crossing by a public 
easement, of a piece of rural property which is 
otherwise a unit in 1tse or value, is allowed to inter-
fere with an award of damages with reference to 
the whole property 1,ohen part is taken.'' 
In support of the quoted staternent, the following 
decisions are cited to the general proposition that a high-
20 
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\Yay or ~treet cutting the propert~· of the conden1nee i:.-5 
in~nfficient to de8troy the unity of a farin, ranch, or 
c ther agricultural property which is used as a whole . 
..:\L~-\1~~-\.Jt .. \ - Pryor v. Li1nestone County (1931) 
2:22 .A.la. t):2l, 13-i ~o. 17 ( 'videning of highway across 
ranch of 3,:200 acres). 
IXDl~-\.N ~\ - Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. 
S1uith (191:2) 177 Ind. 5:2-±, 97 NE lG-! (fee in landowner). 
I0,,1 ... \ - Han1 v. ''Tisconsin, I. & N. R. Co. (1883) 
61 Iowa 716, 17 NW 157. 
K~\NS.A.S - Kansas City, E. & S. R. Co. v. Merrill 
(1881) 25 Kan. -!21 (large ranch, taking of strip for rail-
road.) 
:JI..:-\_RYL ... \ND - Cf. Marchant v. Baltiinore (1924) 
1-!6 ~Id. 513, 126 A 884. 
:JIA.SS ... -\.CHl~SETTS - Tucker v. Massachusetts C. 
R. Co. ( 1875) 118 Mass. 546. 
:JIINNESOTA - Cf. Colvill v. St. Paul & C. R. Co. 
( 1872) 19 l\Iinn. 283, Gil 240; St. Paul & S.C.R. Co. v. 
~I urphy ( 1873) 19 Minn. 500, Gil 433. 
MISSOURI - St. Louis, M. & S.E.R. Co. v. Drum-
Inond Realty & Inves.t Co. (1907) 205 Mo. 167, 103 SW 
977, 120 Am. St. Rep. 724; Kansas City & G.R. Co. v. 
I-Iaake (1932) 331 Mo. 429, 53 SW2d 891, 84 ALR 1477. 
NEW YORK - New York, W.S. & B.R. Co. v. 
LeFevre (1882) 27 Hun. 537. 
PENNSYL\TANIA- Watson v. Pittsburgh & C.R. 
Co. ( 18GO) 37 Pa. 469; Baker v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 
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(1912) 236 Pa. 479, 84 A 959. 
WISCONSIN - Welch v. Milwaukee & St. P.R. Co. 
( 1870) 27 Wis. 108. 
Corpus Juris Secundum (29 C.J.S. 982), has also 
~tated the rule and coallated the cases, and stated the 
law as we believe it to be, 1neasured by the standard of 
justice and authority: 
''Ordinarily contiguity or physical connection be-
tween the separate parcels is essential to the re-
quisite unity. If, however, there be no such physical 
connection, the separate parcels may be considered 
as one if they are so inseparably connected in the 
use to which they are applied that injury or destruc-
tion of one must necessarily and permanently affect 
the other. Hence, although the several tracts do not 
actually adjoin, they may be regarded as one if the 
owner has a connecting right of way over the in-
tervening lands. So the fact that several tracts used 
as one are separated by a street or highway, a water-
course, a railroad right of way, or a county line does 
not necessarily prectude them from being considered 
as one in determining the damages. It has even 
been held that, where two or more parcels of land 
are used as one enterprise and constitute such de-
pendent elements thereof that the taking of one 
necessarily injures the other, they may be taken as 
one, even though separated by an intervening fee." 
Included in the sitations to this statement are some 
of the cases cited in the A.L.R. (2d) coallation. Of sig-
nificance in the group is the case of State vs. H oblitt, 
from Montana, 288 P. 181. 
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rrhe Hoblitt ranch con:5i~ted of 1-l:7 acres, lying East 
of the rail\Yay right of \Yay and a 10-acre tract lying 
,Y.est thereof. and used as a eo\Y pasture. The land taken 
consisted of ~¥2 aeres of the 10-aere tract lying adjacent 
to the raihYay right of way. 
The ranch \\~as crossed by a highway which paral-
leled the rail,Yay and between the two was the dwelling 
house. The barns and corrals were across the road from 
the house. Hoblitt \\~as engaged in farming, dairying and 
raising cattle. horses and hogs for market, and his ar-
rangement was very convenient, and his n1ilk was taken 
up and the can returned practically at the milking place. 
The question for determination was as to what items of 
da1nage should be considered, and after stating the rule 
in practically the identical language of the Corptts Juris 
citation, with specific application to the 10-acre tract, 
the Court said : 
'~Here the 10-acre tract is isolated from the ranch 
proper and forms but an inconsiderable portion 
thereof; but, as it is used for the pasturing of dairy 
cows, milked upon the ranch, the additional incon-
venience and danger in the use of the pasture after 
the highway is constructed would furnish an i~em of 
damages to be considered. Gaddis v. Cherokee 
County, 195 N. C. 107, S. E. 358; Texas Electric Serv-
ice Co. v. Perkins (Tex. Com. App. 1930) 23 S. W. 
(2d) 320." 
In that case the jury awarded $400.00 for the land 
taken and $400.00 consequental damages, and the Court 
said: ''The jury considered and made an award for all 
such da1uaged proved'', which included the da1nages to 
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the whole far1n on both sides of the highway due to the 
severance of the right of way from the 10-acre tract. 
In a Federal case, 
It is said: 
Boetjer v. United States 
143 F (2d) 391 
Cert. denied 
324 us 772 
89 L. ed. 618 
65 S Ct 131 
''The first question before us here, therefore, and 
the basic one in all severance damage cases, is what 
constitutes a 'single' tract as distinguished from 
'separate' ones. The answer does not depend upon ar-
tificial things like boundaries between tracts as es-
tablished in deeds in the owner's chain of title ... , 
nor does it depend necessarily upon whether the o'vn-
er acquired his land in one transaction or even at 
one time ... Neither does it wholly depend upon 
whether holdings are physically contiguous. Con-
tiguous tracts may be 'separate' ones if used sep-
arately ... and tracts physically separated from one 
another may constitute a 'single' tract if put to an 
integrated unitary use or even if the possibility of 
their being so combined in use in the reasonably 
near future . . . is reasonably sufficient to affect 
market value.'' 
THE CARLSON CASE 
Appellant relies upon the Carlson case for a reversal 
of the judgment in this case upon both points of his 
argument: ( 1) The damage to the property North of 
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High\Yay 40, and (2) the aYailability of lands in the 
Yieinity to replaee the land~ taken, in place of all sever-
ance danutges. 
l)l{l)\7"0 RI\""I~~l{ \\~ ..:\ 'l~ER lT~_b~RS ASSN. v. CARLSON 
103 lTtah 93 : 133 P. (2d) 777 
rrhe ('iarlson ease does not decide the question 
\\~hether or not lands n1u:5t be contiguous or whether lands 
Inu~t be physieally i1npaired by the construction of the 
project, in order to establish a case for severance dain-
age:5 or for dan1ages to lands not condemned but impaired 
by the i1nproven1ent. l\lr. Justice McDonough, in the 
1najority opinion, was careful to state that it was not 
necessary in that case to decide that question. 
"(1) In this case, for reasons presently stated, 
it is not necessary to decide whether or not lands 
must be contiguous or whether lands must be.physi-
cally intpaired by the construction project, in order 
to establish a case of severance damages or for dam-
ages to lands not condemned but impaired by the 
improvement.'' 
The point which ruled the Carlson case was the fact, 
assumed by the Court on the appeal, that the proof in 
the case showed that the pasture land inundated by the 
reservoir, which was located a mile and a half from the 
home properties of the owner, could have been replaced 
by the purchase of similar lands to those taken and 
actually located nearer to the base property than those 
already owned by Carlson. 
Although this was disputed 1n the evidence, the 
appellate court assu1ned it to be a proven fact, and made 
it the basis of the decision reversing the case and grant-
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ing a new trial. 
The case was not re-tried, nor was a rnotion for re-
hearing rnade. At about the time the matter \Vas ruled, 
an intensive campaign in the papers and on the radio 
had been carried on by the interests prornoting the Echo 
Reservoir protesting the high verdicts of the juries in 
Wasatch County in those cases, and including the verdict 
in the Carlson case, and settlements were effected, ob-
viating the necessity of re-trials. 
The dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Larson in the 
Carlson case is a very clear statement of the whole mat-
ter, and numerous cases are cited to support his state-
ment: 
''If several tracts are used to get her as a farn/;, in 
deter1nining the compensation to be paid the owner 
on condemnation of only part of the land, the tract 
constitutes a unity and the injury to the whole farm 
should be considered. Grand River Dam Authority 
v. Thompson, 10 Cir., 118 F. 2d 242. See also U.S. 
ex rei, T.V.A. v. Powelson, 4 Cir .. 118 F.2d 79, 87, 
modifying U.S. ex rei T.\T.A. v. Southern St. Power 
Co., D.C., 33 F. Supp. 519; U.S. v. Crary, D.C., 2 F. 
Supp. 870; City of Stockton v. Marengo, 137 Cal. 
App. 760, 31 P.2d 467, 470; State v. Hoblitt, 87 Mont. 
403, 288 P. 181; Dean v. County Bd. of Education, 
210 Ala. 256, 97 So. 7 41; Duggan v. State, 214 Iowa 
230, 242 N.,V. 98; City of Middleboro v. Chasteen, 
285 Ky. 427, 148 S.W. 2d 295; Darlington v. Pennsyl-
vania R. Co. 278 Pa. 307, 123 A. 284; Atchiston T. & 
S.F.R. Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 13 Cal. App. 2d 505, 
57 P.2d 575; City of Stockton v. Ellingwood, 96 Cal. 
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\ -l)~ ·)-.- p •)•)Q. •)l) ' 1 J 1""'')7 t 66. ')9 
.... - pp. ' \.... -4tl .• --"~·- \._· •• , p. tu, no e , .. 
C.J .8 .. En1inent Do1nain, Sec. 1-±0, note 19; Texas 
E1npire Pipe Line v. ~te,vart, 331 ~Io. 525, 55 S.W. 
2d :283 ~ reversing Id., :Jio . ..:\pp., 35 S.W. 2d 627; City 
of St. l~oni~ v. ~t. Louis l.l\1. & S.R. Co., 272 Mo. 
SO. 197 S. \V.. 107. '' 
It Inay be that 've ~tretched the rule of unity of use 
to the breaking point in the Carlson case; but, mainfestly, 
the factual difference in this case fron1 that case, and the 
reservation of the Court, in the 1najority opinion, de-
stroys any potency of that decision as authority against 
I> 
the position of the respondents in this case . 
.:\.nd there are cases that would sustain the allowance 
of severance da1nage to tracts separated by land of other 
private o'vners, if a permissive right of way existed 
across the intervening land, or the two parts were con-
nected by a high,vay, as was the case in Carlson's Case. 
'Vestbrook v. Muscatvie U. & S.R. Co. 
115 Iowa 106 
88 w.w. 202 
In the majority opinion in the Carlson Case, there 
is the following statement: 
''All of the cases in this Court, which we have been 
able to find, have predicated both severance damages 
and damages .to lands not taken, on some physical 
injury to lands not condemned * * * or some other 
condition which would operate to depreciate the 
market val1te of the }Jroperty remaining," 
and rites the following cases from the Supreme Court of 
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the State of Utah: 
State v. District Court 
94 u 384 
78 p (2d) 502 
This was an original proceeding 1n the Supren1e 
Court for a writ of prohibition against the lo,ver court 
in a action brought to enjoin the defendants, State Road 
Commission and others from constructing a viaduct over 
a street crossing. The case involved matter of procedure. 
The opinion of the majority by Judge Hoyt and the 
dissenting 1ninority opinion by Justice Wolfe together 
take 23 printed pages in the Pacific Report, but not one 
word about what is a" parcel" or what is "contiguity". 
Ba1nberger Electric R. Co. v. Public Utilities Co1n. 
59 Utah 351 
204 Pac. 314 
An original proceeding for a writ of review against 
the Public Utilities Commission from an order to the rail-
road to discontinue a private crossing. Procedural mat-
ters were determined. 
Morris v. Oregon S.L.R. Co. 
36 Utah 14 
102 P. 629 
Action by an abutting owner for damages fron1 the 
construction of a railroad in the street. Here is a refer-
ence to ''condemnation.'' 
''Such an action is no different in principle fro1n 
an action for da1nages to the remaining property 
where a part only is condemned. The easement the 
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abutting o'vner has in the ~treet is a property right, 
and an interference w·ith this right is, to the extent 
of the interference, dee1ned a taking of property for 
"Thich, if ~uch taking directly injures the abutting 
property, as aforesaid, the owner may recover dam-
ages.'' 
San Pedro F.~\. & L.R.R. Co. v. Board of Education 
32 Utah 305 
90 Pac. 565 
.... -\ conden1na tion case, for right of v.ray across a 
parcel of land occupied in part by a school house. 
·'Severance'' not involved or mentioned. 
Dooly Block v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Co. 
9 Utah 31 
33 Pac. 229 
Abutting owners enjoined an additional track on the 
street. 
''In such a case an abutting owner need not stand 
by and see his property injured without having any 
means of redress.'' 
Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western R. Co. 
28 Utah 207 
77 Pac. 849 
Action to restrain a switch track. 
Injunction sustained against track located on pri-
vate property. 
"Before the appellant railway con1pany can sub-
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ject the property in question, or any part thereof, to 
the burdens to which it would be subjected by the 
running of cars and engines over the switch referred 
to, it Inust proceed under the law of en1inent do1nain, 
as conte1nplated by the foregoing provision of the 
Constitution, and as required by the statutes of this 
state." 
Contrast the worth of the cases cited in the n1ajorit~~ 
opinion, with those cited by Mr. Justice Larson, in the 
1ninority opinion in the Carlson case! 
In fact, we find no better exposition anywhere of the 
rule as applied generally throughout the several states 
than that stated in the minority opinion which we quote: 
Provo River Water lTsers Association v. Carlson 
133 P (2d) at page 782 
''The right of eminent do1nain exists only upon the 
condition that full payment be 1nade to the owner 
of the property taken for all damages he sustains by 
or as a result of the taking of the property. This 
contemplates not only payment for the property 
actually taken for use of the condemnor but for 
damages resulting to the condemnee by the loss of 
the property so taken. Normally we say the con-
demnee is enti tied to recover the value of the land 
actually taken, plus the damages to the land not 
taken. This expression too often leads to misap-
plication of the true rule of recovery of damages. 
We should think of it in terms of property, not in 
terms of land. The condemnee is entitled to recover 
the full value of the loss he sustains by the infringe-
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1uent of and interference '''ith his legal rights-the 
rig·ht to n~e his physical holding:_.; in any legititnate 
\vay or busines~ he Inay choose. The old rule was 
inclined to be rigid and confine the da1nages recover-
able to the particular tract of land fron1 \vhich the 
taken part \Ya~ seYered. It was then extended to 
per1nit considertaion of da1nages, if any, to con-
tiguous tract~. Later the vision of the law becon1e 
clearer. Instead of seeing through a glass darkly, 
the courts realized that dan1age to property rights 
were not al\\'"ays identical with damage to land as 
such, and the rule of unity of use was reconized and 
applied. This is son1etimes spoken of as unity of 
property. If Yarious tracts of land not contiguous 
are owned by the condemnee, and are so used, and 
operated that the uses to which the owner is putting 
the tracts none of which is taken, is substantially in-
terfered 'vith that constitutes a damage due to the 
taking \Vhich is cognizable in the action. The rule 
is thus laid down in 29 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, Sec. 
140, page 982: 'To constitute a unity of property 
\vithin the rule, there must be such a connection 
or relation of adaption, convenience, and actual and 
permanent use as to make the enjoyment of the par-
cel taken reasonably and substantially necessary to 
the enjoyment of the parcels left, in the most advan-
tageous and profitable manner in the business for 
which they are used. * * * The separate parcels may 
be considered as one if they are so inseparably con-
nected in the use to which they are applied that in-
jury or destruction of one must necessarily and per-
Inanently affect the other'." 
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rrhe writer has examined again every decision in 
every condernnation case from the Supreme Court of 
Utah which he can locate, and has not found a single deci-
sion which defies ''parcel'' or ''tract'', or ''piece of 
property", or "interest in or to property", or fixes a 
rule limiting severance damage to lands contiguous to 
the land taken, except the foregoing quotation fron1 the 
1ninority opinion of ~Ir. Justice Larson in the Carlson 
Case. 
It is, therefore, suggested that recourse be had to 
the annotators and definitions and decisions from other 
jurisdictions. Those hereinbefore cited abundantly sus-
tain his opinion and statement of the law and the rule, 
and justify the julgment for severance damages made 
in this case by Judge Nelson. 
PO~NT II 
NO ADDITIONAL PASTURE LAND WAS AVAIL-
ABLE TO DEFENDANTS. 
POJNT III 
THE CONDEMNEE HAS THE RIGHT TO INSIST 
UPON BEING PAID IN CASH, BOTH FOR THE LAND 
TAKEN AND FOR HIS DAMAGES TO THE REMAIN-
DER. 
The facts of the case do not warrant a finding by 
the appellant court, not made by the trier of the facts, 
that there was additional land in the vicinity that the 
condemnee could acquire with the price paid for the land 
taken from them. 
It needs no argument that a year to year lease 
revocable at will of the lessor, is not a lawful substitute 
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for en~h n1oney dtH' a~ the just eo1npPn~a tion 'vhich the 
Con~titution require~ shall be paid before land it-~ taken 
or da1naged hy the po,ver of the State. 
:Jir. Berg te~tified under oath that his adjacent prop-
erty "·a~ not for sale! 
.. A. negotiation a~ nebulous as the ~ • offer'' hinted at 
by the ...:-\.ttorney tieneral in the Brief, is not a lawful 
~ubstitute for the coin of the realm. 
The defendant i~ entitled to 1noney and ntay not be 
contpelled to accept substitute land elsewhere. 
The trial Court heard the evidence pertaining to the 
leased land and the Berg land, including matters touch-
ing it~ quality, location and value, as well as ''avail-
ability,'' and heard the owner himself, Mr. Berg, swear 
under oath that his land was not for sale. 
In the matter of replacement lands, the majority 
opinion in the Carlson Case is relied upon by appellant 
for reversal of this case. 
The writer has examined again every decision in 
every condemnation case from the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah which he can locate, and has not found a 
single decision requiring a condemnee to prove he cannot 
find lands equal in value and use in the immediate 
vicinity for sale at the price fixed for the land taken, 
before he can recover severance damages! 
PfJJNT IV 
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL 
COURT ART CONCLUSIVE UPON THE FACTS OF VAL-
UE OF THE PROPERTY TAKE.N, UNITY OF THE PAR-
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CEL AND OF DAMAGE THERETO AND THE AMOUNT 
THEREOF RESULTING FROM THE SEVERENCE .. 
Throughout the cases cited in this brief, reference is 
frequently n1ade to the question of the relation of the 
Judge and the Jury in the matter of facts to be found. 
Here Judge Nelson was both Judge and Jury. 
Every question raised by the appellant is upon a 
question of fact. 
The unity of the parcel is a proved fact and a fact 
found. 
l\1:ay this Court ''weigh'' the evidence~ 
POTNT V 
THERE ARE NO ERRORS OF LAW REVIEW ABLE 
BY THE SUPREME COURT CITED AS GROUNDS FOR 
REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT OR NE·W TRIAL. 
There are no errors in the reception of evidence, or 
other rulings in the course of the trial, cited by Appellant 
and relied upon for reversal of the judgment, and no 
motion for new trial was made. 
The Attorney General would have the Court reverse 
this judgment upon his ipsi dixit that "the defendants' 
dairy simply was not diminished in value to that extent 
($10,919.57) by the taking of approximately 6% of its 
pasturage.'' 
POTNT VI 
CONCLUSION: THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED. 
The award of damages in this case is in a sum sub-
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~tantially lP~::-; than the eYidence \Yould have justified. 
There \Ya:s a severance da1nage to the s1nall tracts of 
pa~tnre land that 'vere i:solated by the location of the new 
higlnvay~ and to the entire area of the pasture land, as 
\\·ell as to the sale Yalue of the dairy layout and improve-
lnents on the North side of Highway 40. 
There \Yas a eonsiderable diversity of opinion among 
the \vitne~:ses, but all \vould give son1e to each of those 
parts. 
The testin1ony of the \vitness, Bridge, called by the 
plaintiff, \Yortld justify severance damage of 6 percent of 
the entire farn1, including the barns and other improve-
lnents on the North side of the highway. 
The trial judge was duly considerate of the welfare 
on both sides of the issue. 
No one in this case had a personal interest of any 
kind. 
There \vas a fair trial and a just decision, which we 
sub1nit ought to be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted 
L. C. MONTGOMERY 
ARTHUR WOOLLEY 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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